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WRONGFUL CONVICTION CLAIMS UNDER SECTION 1983
Martin A. Schwartz* and Honorable Robert W Pratt *
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: During the past decade, a num-
ber of studies and articles were published that highlight the rising in-
cidence of wrongful convictions.' These studies identified some of
the leading causes of the rise in wrongful convictions, including the
mishandling of forensic evidence,2 false confessions,3 suggestive
identification procedures used by the police,' and misconduct by
* Professor of Law, Touro Law Center. B.B.A., cum laude, 1966, City College of New
York; J.D., magna cum laude, 1968, Brooklyn Law School; L.L.M., 1973, New York Uni-
versity School of Law. Professor Schwartz has authored leading treatises including Section
1983 Litigation: Claims and Defenses (4th ed. 2004-2006), Section 1983 Litigation: Federal
Evidence (4th ed. 2007) and Section 1983 Litigation: Jury Instructions (2007). He is co-
author of Section 1983 Litigation: Statutory Attorney's Fees (3d ed. 1991 & Supp. 2011).
Professor Schwartz is also the author of a bi-monthly column for the New York Law Journal
entitled "Public Interest Law." He is lead author of Section 1983 Litigation, Second Edition
(Federal Judicial Center 2008). He chairs the Practising Law Institute's annual programs on
Section 1983 litigation and Trial Evidence and co-chairs its annual Supreme Court Review
program. This Article is based on a presentation originally delivered at the Practising Law
Institute's Twenty-Seventh Annual Conference on Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation in
New York, New York on October 28, 2010. The author expresses appreciation for the valu-
able assistance of the editors of the Touro Law Review in the preparation of this Article.
Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.
See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony
and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2009) (studying the incidence of wrongful
convictions later vacated by DNA testing results); Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless
Error, and Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 35, 36 (2005).
2 See Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 1, at 16. This point was further recognized by Justice
Scalia in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, identifying forensic science as a practice with
"[s]erious deficiencies . .. in criminal trials." 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2009).
See Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Injustice in Potentially
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 58 (1987) (calculating that fourteen percent of all
wrongful convictions examined in their study have been caused in large part from coerced or
false confessions). Studies also show that false confessions take place much more often than
people earlier supposed. See id. at 23 (discussing the alarming lack of awareness of wrong-
ful convictions over the past century).
4 See N. CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT, RIGHTING AND PREVENTING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
IN CALIFORNIA 11 (2006), available at http://law.scu.edu/ncip/File/causes-of-wrongful-
convictions.pdf.
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prosecutors and other law enforcement agents.5 Whether a victim of
a wrongful conviction may recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 19836
depends upon the resolution of several issues, some potentially diffi-
cult. Undoubtedly, the plaintiff's right to recover damages under
§ 1983 for wrongful conviction is a high-stakes issue, as evidenced
by several recent significant monetary settlements and awards.' Giv-
en that these § 1983 actions can involve potentially difficult ques-
tions, it is helpful to initially identify the various issues.
The first issue is the identification of the type of constitutional
violation alleged by the wrongfully convicted individual. Supreme
Court precedent recently applied by the circuit courts holds that a
prosecutor's knowing use of perjured testimony or other false evi-
dence violates procedural due process.8  However, a court must de-
termine the point at which the constitutional violation occurs. The
question is whether a law enforcement officer's fabrication of evi-
dence alone constitutes unconstitutional conduct, or whether the con-
stitutional violation occurs only when the fabricated evidence is in-
troduced by the prosecutor at trial.9
Brady violationslo are being alleged in § 1983 actions with
increased frequency. A Brady claim under § 1983 will not succeed
against a prosecutor due to the absolute immunity afforded prosecu-
See Garrett, supra note 1, at 42-43. This misconduct has often included suppression of
exculpatory evidence, fabrication of evidence, and coercion of confessions. See id at 45.
See also Newsome v. McCabe, 319 F.3d 301, 302-03 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming a jury find-
ing that the defendant's due process rights were violated by the concealment of evidence fa-
vorable to the defense).
6 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2011).
7 See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 121 (2008). In
2007, District Court Judge Nancy Gertner awarded over $100 million to plaintiffs framed by
the FBI after spending over thirty years in jail for murder. See Richard Moran, The Presence
ofMalice, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2007, at A17.
8 See, e.g., Morris v. YIst, 447 F.3d 735, 737-83 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S.
1125 (2007) (citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1935)); Limone v. Condon,
372 F.3d 39, 45 (1st Cir. 2004).
9 See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 1994).
'0 The Supreme Court, in Brady v. Maryland, holds that "the suppression by the prosecu-
tion of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evi-
dence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith
of the prosecution." 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). In Brady, the Court explicitly demanded that
prosecutors disclose exculpatory evidence to the criminal defendant, effectively "launch[ing]
the modem development of constitutional disclosure requirements." Bennett L. Gershman,
Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 686 (2006).
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tors for carrying out their adversary functions." However, law en-
forcement agents do not enjoy the same absolute immunity enjoyed
by prosecutors, and instead are afforded only qualified immunity.12
Therefore, in order for the § 1983 plaintiffs (criminal defendant's)
claim to have a realistic chance to succeed, it would likely have to be
asserted against the individual law enforcement officer. Of course,
this requires a showing that the law enforcement officer was respon-
sible for the Brady violation. A law enforcement officer has an af-
firmative due process obligation under Brady to submit exculpatory
evidence to the prosecutor. 13
In the context of a criminal prosecution, a Brady violation
may come about as a result of negligence by the prosecutor.14 In ex-
amining Brady violations, the Supreme Court has expressed its lack
of concern for the prosecutor's good or bad faith, and focuses not on
the character of the prosecutor, but only on the exculpatory character
1 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976); Yarris v. Cnty. of Delaware, 465
F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2006).
12 See, e.g., Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635 (1987); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986); see also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
555-57 (1967) (holding that police officers are entitled to a qualified immunity and that of-
ficers must assert that the arrest was made in good faith and that there was probable cause to
make the arrest in order to avoid § 1983 liability).
13 In Kyles v. Whitley, the Supreme Court extended Brady by imposing an affirmative duty
on a prosecutor to "learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the gov-
ernment's behalf in the case, including the police." 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). The Court
did not "discuss the relative disclosure obligations of police" in Brady or Kyles. Walker v.
City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 299 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 961 (1993).
With room left for interpretation, some courts have extended this prosecutorial obligation as
creating an affirmative duty upon law enforcement agents to submit all potentially exculpa-
tory evidence to the prosecutor because an officer who deliberately withholds evidence will
prevent a prosecutor from complying with Brady. See, e.g., Jean v. Collins, 221 F.3d 656,
663 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1076 (2001) (holding by an equally di-
vided vote that a police officer who, acting in bad faith, intentionally withholds evidence,
and thereby prevents a prosecutor from adhering to Brady, has violated the defendant's due
process rights); Walker, 974 F.2d at 299 (ruling that the "police satisfy their obligation under
Brady when they turn exculpatory evidence over to the prosecutors").
14 Compare Kyles, 514 U.S. at 420 (stating that the prosecutor has a duty to disclose evi-
dence that may be favorable to the defense "regardless of any failure by the police to bring
favorable defense to the prosecutor's attention"), and Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1305
(11th Cir. 2007) (stating that, in a criminal context, a defendant can establish a Brady viola-
tion by showing that evidence favorable to his case was not disclosed to defense counsel,
regardless of the prosecution's good or bad faith), with Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
328 (1986) (stating that, in a civil action, "the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated
by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or prop-
erty").
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of the evidence.'s This leads to the question of whether a § 1983
procedural due process claim for a Brady violation against a law en-
forcement officer may be based upon the officer's negligence. The
answer is unclear because the Supreme Court precedent holds that in
a § 1983 action, a due process violation may not be based upon an
official's negligent conduct.16  Instead, the Court requires that the
§ 1983 plaintiff show intentional wrongdoing or deliberate indiffe-
rence." This establishes an unusual set of circumstances in which
the Due Process Clause may effectively have two different meanings:
one in the context of a criminal prosecution with respect to the prose-
cutor's Brady obligations, where negligence may give rise to a Brady
violation, and the other in the context of an affirmative § 1983 due
process claim against the law enforcement officer, where negligence
may not suffice to establish a due process violation.
Another difficult question arising under Brady concerns the
element of a Brady violation requiring a criminal defendant to show a
reasonable probability that the result in the criminal case would have
been different had the exculpatory material been given to the de-
fense.' 8 Because this is a hypothetical inquiry, how can one ever
know for sure whether there is a reasonable probability of a different
outcome? In a § 1983 action, would this be an issue decided by the
judge as a matter of law, or an issue of fact that would be presented to
the jury? These questions remain unanswered.
Causation is yet another issue that may arise because there is
a proximate cause element in the plaintiffs claim for relief under
§ 1983.19 This may raise difficult questions in the law enforcement
context when multiple parties are involved in the alleged constitu-
tional violation. It may be difficult to determine exactly where the
" Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
16 See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); see also Cnty. of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848-49 (1998) (stating that because the Court refuses to impose liabili-
ty every time a state officer causes harm, "liability for negligently inflicted harm [will be]
categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process").
17 See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 327; see also Lewis, 523 U.S. at 833.
1 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (holding that a Brady violation will
be found "only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different").
19 See Graham v. Baughman, 772 F.2d 441, 446 (8th Cir. 1985) ("In order for a plaintiff in
a § 1983 action to be entitled to compensatory damages for a violation of procedural due
process, he must prove that the violation actually was the cause of his injury or depriva-
tion.").
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chain of causation breaks: 0 With the police officer? His supervisor?
The prosecutor? After a grand jury indictment, or even the state
court decision? This determination will ultimately rest upon which
actions by the particular official were reasonably foreseeable. 2 1
Section 1983 cases involving a plaintiff who claims that he or
she was wrongfully convicted and seeks monetary relief often invoke
the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey.22 Under the Heck doctrine, the
plaintiffs claim is not cognizable if the claim attacks the constitutio-
nality of the conviction or the sentence, unless the conviction or sen-
tence has been overturned.23 Interestingly, this doctrine presents an
even more rigorous prerequisite than a requirement that the plaintiff
exhausted available state remedies.24
In Van de Kamp v. Goldstein,25 the Supreme Court really held
that when the prosecutor's administrative functions are so closely re-
lated to the trial process, they too are protected by the prosecutor's
absolute immunity.26 Cases like Van de Kamp demonstrate some of
the other immunity issues that arise in this area. For example, in Van
de Kamp, it was conceivable that the plaintiff could have brought a
claim against one or more of the witnesses in the case. However, of-
ficers who testify have an absolute witness immunity in exchange for
their testimony, 27 and likely escape liability for this reason alone.
20 See Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 347 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing the factors looked
at by courts in making this type of determination and the resulting inconsistencies).
21 See Powers v. Hamilton Cnty. Pub. Defender Comm'n, 501 F.3d 592, 609-11 (6th Cir.
2007) (relying upon the reasonable foreseeability that the harm was a result of the defen-
dant's conduct, the court found that a public defender's failure to request an indigency hear-
ing was the proximate cause of a prisoner's injury); see also lA MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ,
SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES ch. 6 (4th ed. 2003).
22 512 U.S. 477, 478-79 (1994) (involving an Indiana prisoner who brought a lawsuit
against the state prosecutors claiming that the prosecutors manufactured evidence).
23 Id. at 486-87.
24 See id. at 480-81 (stating that the exhaustion of state remedies is not necessarily re-
quired under § 1983). Some courts have referred to this situation as being "Heck-barred."
See, e.g., McCann v. Neilsen, 466 F.3d 619, 621 (7th Cir. 2007). One magistrate judge even
stated that the plaintiff "seeks to prove the merits of his case in this § 1983 action, which is
precisely what the Heck court meant to prevent." Slater v. Henderson, No. 5:05-CV-152
(CWH), 2006 WL 1652516, at *1 (M.D. Ga. June 14, 2006).
25 129 S. Ct. 855 (2009).
26 Id. at 864-65 (focusing not on the way in which the information was delivered, but in-
stead on the way in which it is maintained).
27 See Brisco v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335-36, 345-46 (1983) (reinforcing the common
law absolute immunity from damages "for all persons-governmental or otherwise-who
were integral parts of the judicial process").
2011] 225
TOURO LAW REVIEW
But would this absolute immunity extend to an inappropriate agree-
ment or conspiracy to give false testimony? The Second Circuit an-
swers this question in the negative, stating that absolute immunity
would not cover an agreement that was made outside of the judicial
process.28 Conversely, other circuits that have considered this issue
have held that absolute witness immunity extends to the agreement or
conspiracy.29
HONORABLE ROBERT W. PRATT: The line of § 1983
cases includes incredible examples such as a Massachusetts case in-
volving the FBI reportedly withholding evidence that resulted in four
wrongful convictions, 30 and the trial and aftermath of Senator Ted
Stevens's prosecution in the District of Columbia which resulted in
the suicide of a prosecutor and investigation after the "botched" tri-
al.3 ' This may be the tip of the very ugly iceberg that represents the
way in which personal liberties are treated in this country.
McGhee v. Pottawattamie County32 is a case that presents an
excellent application of these principles. McGhee, a case tinged with
racial overtones, involved two African American plaintiffs who were
convicted of murder in 1978.33 The plaintiffs had separate trials and
their respective verdicts stood for twenty-three years.34 The victim,
John Schweer, spent his life as a Council Bluffs, Iowa police offic-
er.3 5 After retirement, he became a night security guard in a used car
lot. 36 Prior to the murder, there was a conflict between the decedent
28 Dory v. Ryan, 25 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that witnesses have immunity
for their testimony, but do not enjoy immunity for extra-judicial conduct like that of a con-
spiracy).
29 See, e.g., Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1289 (11th Cir. 1999); Miller v. Glanz, 948
F.2d 1562, 1571 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that without such an extension, "a defendant could
simply transform the perjury complaint into an allegation of a conspiracy" and further hold-
ing that the extension "serves the same important purposes of immunity to witnesses them-
selves").
30 See Limone v. United States, 579 F.3d 79, 83, 99-100 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding FBI of-
ficers' actions of withholding exculpatory evidence and encouraging a witness to be the
proximate cause of the defendants' wrongful convictions resulting in the defendants being in
prison for over thirty years, where two died before their release).
31 See Charlie Savage, Prosecutor Who Pursued Stevens Case Kills Himself N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 2010, at A19.
32 (McGhee 1), 547 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 925.
34 id
6 Id. at 926.
226 [Vol. 27
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and Charles Gates, a man with a rather infamous history and relation-
ship with the victim. 37 Mr. Gates was an alternate suspect, a fact that
was never disclosed to the criminal defendants during the course of
the pretrial or trial proceedings.38 In fact, the defendants, as well as
two police officers and two prosecutors, testified at a post-conviction
hearing that no such suspect ever existed. 39 In 1999, after befrien-
ding an employee of the state penitentiary where they were incarce-
rated, the defendants gained possession of the police file for their
case. The file contained documents pointing to an alternate suspect.40
After presenting this evidence, the Iowa Supreme Court granted new
trials for the defendants in 2003.41
Before his new trial, Terry Harrington was offered a second-
degree murder plea, but refused to take it because he claimed inno-
cence.4 2  The second defendant, Curtis McGhee, pled guilty to
second-degree murder. 4 3 However, his case never went to the Su-
preme Court because his conviction was voluntarily set aside." In
2005, both defendants brought wrongful conviction claims.4 5 Even-
tually, the parties reached a settlement totaling $12 million, with Mr.
Harrington receiving $7,030,000 and Mr. McGhee receiving
$4,970,000.46
In the civil case, the prosecutors claimed absolute immunity
arguing that immunity applied because they were acting as advocates
in a criminal prosecution for conduct "intimately associated with the
judicial process." 4 7 However, as discussed in the oral argument, this
immunity is generally only available after probable cause to arrest ex-
3 See McGhee I, 547 F.3d at 926 (referring to Mr. Gates as an alternate suspect in both
this murder and the murder of a co-worker that occurred more than ten years earlier).
38 Id
40 McGhee v. Pottawattamie Cnty. (McGhee II), 475 F. Supp. 2d 862, 874 (S.D. Iowa
2007), aff'd in part rev'd in part, 547 F.3d 922.
41 Id at 874-75.
42 Id at 878.
43 Id at 876-77.
4 Id
45 McGhee II, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 866-67.
46 $12 Million Wrongful Conviction Settlement is Hailed, DES MOINEs REG., Jan. 5, 2010,
at Al, available at 2010 WLNR 854334.
47 Appellee Terry Harrington's Response Brief, McGhee I, 547 F.3d 922 (07-1453, 07-
1524), 2007 WL 6370526.
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ists. 48 The issue presented was the time at which the liability for the
prosecutors attached.49 Summary judgment was denied because a
jury would have been able to find that probable cause was lacking.so
Although a witness implicated the plaintiffs, law enforcement had
ample reason to doubt the witness' credibility given the number of
ever-changing versions of events he had given.5
Council Bluffs is a small town of about 60,000 people.5 2 It is
easy to imagine that in a small community such as this, there would
be a great deal of pressure on the prosecutors to solve the murder of a
long-time police officer. The events leading up to the case cast some
doubt on the prosecutors' actions, creating a jury question about the
liability of the prosecutors both before and after filing the charges,
thereby bringing up the question of qualified immunity.53
The issue that eventually went before the Supreme Court was
whether the prosecutors were entitled to either absolute immunity or
qualified immunity.54 In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,5 the Supreme Court
held that "government officials performing discretionary functions
are generally shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known."5 6 In consi-
dering whether an official may rely on qualified immunity to escape
civil liability, the Court measures the objective legal reasonableness
of the unconstitutional act against the clearly established law at the
time of the action. 7 Compare this standard with the Second Circuit
48 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 31-32, Pottawattamie Cnty. v. McGhee (McGhee
Ill), 129 S. Ct. 2002 (2009) (No. 08-1065), 2009 WL 3640088.
49 See McGhee II, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 881.
s0 Id. at 884.
51 Id.
52 State & County Quick Facts: Council Bluffs, Iowa, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/19/1916860.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2011).
" McGhee 1, 547 F.3d at 926-27, 929. In the Eighth Circuit, the qualified immunity issue
with police officers was relatively simple to evaluate because of precedent stating that, with
respect to police officers, there is no qualified immunity. McGhee II, 475 F. Supp. 2d at
912.
54 See Brief in Opposition for Respondent Terry J. Harrington, McGhee III, 129 S. Ct.
2002 (No. 08-1065), 2009 WL 720926, at *i (stating that the question presented was "
'[w]hether this Court's prosecutorial immunity precedent may be expanded to retrospective-
ly extend absolute immunity to prosecutors' investigative functions").
" 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
s6 Id. at 818.
* Id. at 815.
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where the court found it difficult to reconcile the defendant's proposi-
tion that a prosecutor who uses false evidence at trial, which he in
fact manufactured, would be immune from liability, while a police
officer that manufactures false evidence subsequently used by a pros-
ecutor at trial would be liable." The Second Circuit further con-
cluded that the prosecutor's alleged fabrication and use of evidence
effectively caused the plaintiffs deprivation of liberty by denying
him due process.5 9
This finding is at issue with the Court's decision in Heck.
Heck involved what Justice Scalia referred to as the intersection of
two federal statutes that often collide: § 1983 and habeas corpus. 60 In
Heck, the Court stated that a proceeding cannot be brought against a
prosecutor for manufacturing evidence without the prior conviction
first being vacated or overturned. 6' Applying this principle to Mr.
McGhee, who pled guilty to second-degree murder, and whose con-
viction was never set aside as Mr. Harrington's was, it is clear that
the circumstances are similar to those in Heck.
Another issue that arises is damages. Title 42, section
1988(a) of the United States Code states that civil rights law must be
"exercised and enforced in conformity with" federal law.62 However,
if federal law does not exist or is deficient, then state law applies.63
This issue arose in Harrington v. Wilbur,6 where I held that pro tan-
to was contrary to the legislative intent of § 1983.65 In Harrington,
the defendants requested pro tanto, which would offset any verdict
that the plaintiffs might receive. 6 Although the jury was not told
that the plaintiffs were paid twelve million dollars, if the jury re-
turned a verdict of twelve million dollars or less, then the effect of re-
58 Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 346, 352-53 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that "[a]ctions tak-
en as an advocate enjoy absolute immunity, while actions taken as an investigator enjoy only
qualified immunity" and discussing the difficulties in comprehending the assumption of lia-
bility at different points in the chain of causation).
s9 Id. at 349 (holding that "the right at issue in this case is appropriately identified as the
right not to be deprived of liberty as a result of the fabrication of evidence by a government
officer acting in an investigating capacity").
60 Heck, 512 U.S. at 480.
61 Id. at 486-87.
62 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988(a) (West 2011).
63 id.
6 No. 4:03-CV-90616(L), 2010 WL 4231218 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 22, 2010).
61 Id. at *5.
66 Id. at *3.
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67turning a verdict against the remaining defendants would be zero.
In McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde,68 an admiralty case, the Supreme
Court considered a similar issue and held that pro tanto was "inequit-
able."6 9  This case provided the basis for the rationale in Harring-
ton. 70 Therefore, I declined to use the pro tanto approach because it
did not go to the legislative intent of § 1983.n
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: There are many issues here-
some are quite tedious and nuanced, and some have no clear answers.
When federal law cannot resolve an issue in a § 1983 case, § 1988(a)
instructs federal district judges to apply state law, so long as it is con-
sistent with the policies of § 1983.72
Although this does not sound especially complex on the sur-
face, each part of this analysis can create difficulties. A court must
first decide whether there is federal law on the particular issue.73
Sometimes it is clear that there is no federal law. For example, there
is no statute of limitations for § 1983 cases; therefore, the district
court judge must apply the state law limitations period.74 However,
federal judges sometimes turn to state law even when federal law is
available.
An example involves circuit court law concerning tolling of
the statute of limitations when is it subject to equitable tolling or
equitable estoppel.76 Many of the relevant decisions confuse the two
concepts, even though a body of federal law addressing the meanings
of equitable tolling and equitable estoppel exists.77 Federal courts
commonly adopt state law tolling concepts-including concepts of
equitable tolling and equitable estoppel-when they adopt the state
law limitations period.78 However, this might not be the correct ap-
67 Id. at *5.
68 511 U.S. 202 (1994).
69 Id. at 214 ("In sum, the pro tanto approach, even when supplemented with good faith
hearings, is likely to lead to inequitable apportionments of liability . . .
70 Harrington, 2010 WL 4231218, at *6.
71 Id. at *5.
72 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988(a); IB MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS
AND DEFENSES § 12.01[A] (4th ed. 2003).
73 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, § 12.01[B] n.10.
74 Id. § 12.01[B].
" Id. § 12.05[C].
SId.
7 Id.
78 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, § 12.05[C]
230 [Vol. 27
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proach because state law should not be used when a federal principle
of law exists, as explicitly stated in § 1988.79 The virtue of applying
existing federal law is having uniform federal principles with respect
to a federal cause of action. Conversely, the issue will be addressed
differently in each state if the district judge turns to state law on the
question.so
HONORABLE ROBERT W. PRATT: In McGhee, the court
relied on federal law found specifically in Banks ex rel. Banks v. Yo-
kemick," where the Southern District of New York stated that the
"driving force" of the pro tanto rule was preventing a windfall to the
plaintiff. 82 The court said that the policy of the pro tanto rule was to
ensure victim compensation, while at the same time prevent unjust
enrichment of the victim at the expense of court fees.83 However, the
pro tanto rule, "in the name of avoiding unjust enrichment for the
plaintiff, . . . in essence would effectuate a windfall to the defen-
dant." 84 This result is inconsistent with federal policy.85 Therefore,
the Banks court ultimately found the pro tanto approach incompatible
with the deterrent effect of § 1983,86 which was intended to "favor
fairness first for the interest of the injured party, rather than pro-
mot[e] an economic equilibrium that tips the benefit of the doubt and
resulting equities towards the wrongdoer." 87
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: We have not focused explicitly
on § 1983 malicious prosecution claims, which have their own con-
voluted body of law. Malicious prosecution claims should be de-
cided based on Fourth Amendment violations.88 However, the claims
discussed here are normally based on procedural due process viola-
tions as opposed to substantive due process. 89 The difficulties re-
79 id
80 Id
" 177 F. Supp. 2d 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
82 Id. at 260 ("At its most basic level, the driving force embodied in [the New York sta-
tute] is that of ensuring the compensation of victims while preventing their unjust enrich-
ment.").
83 id
* Id at 261.
" See id. at 262.
86 Banks, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 261.
87 Id at 260.
88 See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 276 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
8 Id. at 275-76 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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garding this issue started with Albright v. Oliver,90 where the plaintiff
attempted to assert a due process malicious prosecution claim.9' In
Albright, the Supreme Court stated that a malicious prosecution claim
must be asserted under the Fourth Amendment, rather than under
substantive due process.92 However, it is very difficult to determine
exactly what the Court held because there were so many opinions. 3
Every circuit has its own body of § 1983 malicious prosecu-
tion law, which is not an ideal situation. 94 The characterization of
these claims should be made as some kind of constitutional violation
such as the Fourth Amendment. This demonstrates that in § 1983
work, so much depends upon the law of the particular circuit with re-
spect to a particular issue.
Section 1983 issues are often discussed and analyzed as dis-
crete issues even though they are interconnected. Prosecutorial im-
munity, qualified immunity, municipal liability,95 and pleading stan-
dards are all talked about separately rather than in connection with
one another. However, as a result of viewing the issues separately,
the Supreme Court has failed to consider the interplay of the various
issues.
" Id. at 266.
91 Id. at 269 (plurality opinion).
92 Id. at 276 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
93 There were six opinions in the case. Albright, 510 U.S. at 266.
94 See, e.g., Fulton v. Robinson, 289 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. 2002); Kurtz v. City of Shrews-
bury, 245 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 2001); Gunderson v Schlueter 904 F.2d 407 (8th Cir. 1990).
9 Subsequent to the Practising Law Institute Section 1983 Litigation, the Supreme Court,
in a wrongful conviction case, held that to establish municipal liability based upon inade-
quate training of prosecutors of their Brady obligations, the § 1983 plaintiff must establish a
pattern of constitutional violations. See Connick v. Thompson, No. 09-571, 2011 WL
1119022 (Mar. 29, 2011).
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